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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the ending of moderate rates of inflation in three transition
economies, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland at the end of 1998. We argue that
the institutions for the conduct of monetary policy in these countries were relatively weak
and that monetary policy was unsupported by fiscal policy and hampered by multiple
objectives. Using a VAR model of inflation, we show that, under a variety of
assumptions, foreign prices and the persistence of inflation are the key determinants of
inflation in these countries. From this finding we conclude that the end of moderate
inflation in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland was largely due to the decline in
import prices in the second half of 1998, and thus it may be a temporary phenomenon.
JEL Classification: P2 and E5
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I. INTRODUCTION
A number of transition economies, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland
among them, have seemingly stabilized their economies, built up the institutions required
for the functioning of a modern market economy, privatized the greater part of their
productive assets, restructured their industries and integrated themselves into the global
economy. Perhaps most remarkably, after being stuck at double-digit levels of inflation of
a “moderate” level (see, e.g., Medgyessy, 1998; Dornbusch and Fischer, 1993, Ball,
1994: Burton and Fischer, 1998), at the end of 1998 or the beginning of 1999, the
inflation rates of these countries, as measured by the consumer price index (CPI), fell to
single digit levels, as shown in Figure 1. Indeed, on a month-on-month basis, these
countries were experiencing no inflation or even deflation at the end of 1998 and the
beginning of 1999. Some observers have interpreted this outcome, which few would have
predicted at the beginning of 1998, as a lesson on how to end persistent moderate
inflation in other transition economies. Before we accept the policy choices made by
these three countries as a guide for ending moderate inflation in other transition
economies, it behooves us to examine more closely whether, indeed, the results now
before us can be the direct outcome of the policies followed or whether a more cautious
interpretation of these results is warranted.
During the early stages of transition, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland
implemented stabilization programs based on nominal anchors, primarily the exchange
rate but also at times the wage rate, and they relied largely on direct controls and
quantitative restrictions to implement monetary policy. Subsequently, as stabilization
took hold and as their financial institutions and markets matured, all of them abandoned
the pegging of their nominal exchange rates and adopted indirect methods of monetary
control.
1 In this paper, we examine whether a disinflation that reduced inflation to single
digit levels, even to low single digit levels, could be the outcome of the monetary policies
and the institutional environment of these countries. We consider the instruments of
monetary policy and argue that the process of transition and the building up of market
economy institutions probably has not progressed sufficiently to allow indirect
                                                       
1 For the Czech Republic, see Begg, 1998; for Hungary, see Szapary and Jakab, 1998 and, for Poland,
Wellisz, 1997.3
instruments of monetary policy to bring inflation to the levels being currently being
experienced. We are also not sanguine about the ability of monetary instruments to root
out moderate inflation because, as we argue below, monetary policy is overburdened by
having to pursue multiple objectives and because it is inadequately supported by fiscal
policy.
We also examine whether approaches such as inflation targeting can be used
effectively by transition economies. Much of our argument rests on an analysis of the
root causes of inflation in these economies. This analysis concludes that the principal
causes of inflation are either exogenous or beyond the direct control of the monetary
authorities. Therefore, we should be cautious in accepting recent inflation results as a
signal that moderate inflation in these transition economies has been conquered by past
monetary policies.
II. THE FRAMEWORK FOR MONETARY POLICY
A. The Institutional Basis for Monetary Policy
While we accept the notion that the long-run effect of monetary policy is to be
found in the movements of prices and not of real output, there are important short-term
links between the real and monetary spheres in transition economies. On the one hand,
the rate of inflation does influence the decisions of firms and consumers about the level
of saving and investment as well as about the specific form that these will take. At the
same time, the effectiveness of monetary policy depends to a large extent on the behavior
of the real sector. The effectiveness of indirect methods of monetary control now
employed in the three countries under consideration also depends on the effectiveness of
monetary institutions, including capital markets and the banking system.
Although there has been some tightening of the budget constraint for firms in all
three countries, it is not at all evident this emerging financial discipline has been
sufficient to drive loss-making firms into bankruptcy rather than leaving them in a limbo
of growing indebtedness and payments arrears.. Firms continue to run losses that are
sometimes covered by government subsidies, sometimes by loans from banks and4
sometimes by other enterprises.
2 In such circumstances, firms lack the incentives to
restructure and thus to respond appropriately to changes in interest rates. Indeed, they
may behave perversely, engaging in increased borrowing and in more risky investments,
including leveraged takeovers of rivals, as the interest rate increases. Privatization has
also reduced the effectiveness of monetary policy by placing many firms in the hands of
foreign MNCs and thus enabling them to evade home-country monetary policies through
their access to parent-company funds (Hawkins and Macaluso, 1977; Estrin et al.,
forthcoming). There is also evidence that the real sector, meaning non-financial firms, is
to a large extent self -financed, as the net flow of funds has been largely from the non-
financial sector to banks rather than the other way (Dittus, 1994). Moreover, there is
compelling evidence that it is the less efficient and unprofitable firms that receive a
disproportionate share of the loans that are made to businesses (see, e.g., Bonin and
Schaffer, 1994; Coricelli, 1998, Ch. 2). 
The distortions evident in the real sector also have their counterparts in the
monetary sector. Commercial banks in the three countries face a number of problems.
Relative to their bad loans, they appear to be under-capitalized. In Hungary and the
Czech Republic, they have had to have some of their bad loans written off, while in
Poland they have been encouraged to attempt to work out problem loans.
3 Neither
approach has entirely resolved the problems of commercial banks, and much new lending
in all three countries continues to go to firms that are likely to become problem borrowers
in the future. In part, this is due to the fact that the banks are captives of enterprises to
whom they have lent in the past and whose outstanding loans they continue to roll over
through new financing rather than writing them off. In part, it is due to the fact that the
commercial banks simply lack the personnel needed to make better lending decisions.
Finally, the pattern of privatization in the transition economies also plays a role in the
lending policies of commercial banks. Especially in the Czech Republic, the banks,
                                                       
2 While explicit subsidies have been reduced, there are implicit subsidies in the form of tax-payment
arrears, guarantees of loans using government-owned stock, etc. The lack of effective bankruptcy
procedures and so-called creditor passivity continue to play an important part in all three economies.
3 For bank reforms and behavior, see Mochrie et al. (1998), van Vijnbergen (1995) and the special issue of
the Journal of Comparative Economics (1996) dealing with commercial banking in transition economies. It
is noteworthy that in 1998 Hungary was engaged in a major rescue of its two largest commercial banks
while the largest commercial bank in the Czech Republic is arguably in worse condition now than it was at
the beginning of the transition.5
although “privatized”, have the state as their largest share holder, and thus the state’s
preferences regarding lending decisions may play a decisive role. Czech commercial
banks not only lend to firms, but in many cases they are also the largest share holders of
these firms, creating further incentives to continue lending to problem firms.
The existence of large problem loans has led monetary authorities to maintain
high spreads between lending and borrowing rates so as to boost banks’ profits and thus
their ability to build up their reserves. However, in addition to discouraging savers from
placing funds with the banking system and firms from borrowing from it, both of which
reduce the effectiveness of monetary policy, the creation of these artificial profits in the
banking sector has had three other negative consequences for the effectiveness of
monetary policy. One is the emergence of small under-capitalized banks that lack the
skills and perhaps even the desire to make prudent loans; many of these banks have gone
under or have had to be absorbed by larger banks. However, their presence in the
financial system has undermined the efficiency with which credit is allocated to non-
financial firms and impeded the functioning of the inter-bank credit market. A second
consequence has been the entry of foreign banks, which have been alleged to engage in
“cherry picking” or selecting only the most credit worthy of the local firms for clients and
leaving the less attractive borrowers for the local banks. The third consequence has been
that local firms have tended to borrow abroad, thus bypassing local banks and, therefore,
also domestic monetary policy.
Exacerbating the manifest weaknesses of the credit markets is the fact that stock
markets in the three countries do not provide a viable substitute. They are thin and subject
to extreme swings in prices, often as the result of inflows and outflows of foreign capital.
Moreover, these stock markets have not been very effective in raising funds through
IPOs. In part this is due to the rather disappointing returns they have generated. 
The foregoing discussion suggests that, to the extent that monetary policy needs
to influence the behavior of banks and non-bank actors in the economy to be effective,
there is reason to doubt that there has been enough progress to date to ensure that such
influence will be sufficiently predictable and strong to guarantee that indirect tools of
monetary policy can effectively reduce inflation. Moreover, the fact that monetary policy
is to some extend dictated by the need to encourage the restructuring of firms, to6
recapitalize the banking system and to enable the government to finance its deficits
suggests that the monetary authorities in these countries are likely to face severe conflicts
in the formulation of monetary policy.
B. Coordination of Fiscal and Monetary Policy
A dispassionate view of economic policy in the three countries suggests that
monetary policy has had to bear the brunt of the stabilization effort while governments
have been relatively unwilling to make unpopular decisions to reduce fiscal deficits. In
the case of Poland, Wellisz (1997) notes that, during the 1991-93 period,“[i] t is
clear…that the monetization of the fiscal deficit acted as the ‘motor of inflation’” (p. 165)
while subsequently the government borrowed from commercial banks, driving up interest
rates so that “fiscal policy…. is at the root of the credit tightness decried by borrowers”
(p. 169). Of course, this same credit crunch constrains the monetary policies of the
National Bank of Poland (NBP). While the government’s deficit is not especially high, it
is expanding as a share of GDP and thus can hardly be viewed as contributing to the fight
against inflation.
Much the same can be said about the contribution of fiscal policy to stabilization
in Hungary, where the general government deficit reached 8.4% of GDP in 1994
(Haggard et al., 1998). It was only an impending economic crisis that led to the Bokros
package of reforms that, according to Kornai (1997), “…brought to an end the habitual
(fiscal policy-our insert) conduct of decades – the policy of ‘muddling through’” (p.125).
Nevertheless, despite Kornai’s optimistic assessment, the Hungarian deficit has grown of
late, thus leaving the battle against inflation largely to monetary policy.
In the Czech Republic, officially reported fiscal deficits have been small but
increasing. During the period leading up to the speculative attack on the koruna in May
1997, the government proved unable to act to tighten fiscal policy, and it was only in the
aftermath of the attack on the koruna that measures were taken to reduce the deficit
(Brada and Kutan, 1999). Despite this harsh lesson, the newly elected government has
enacted a much more expansionary budget for 1999.
In sum, while monetary policy, at least as measured by real interest rates, has
been tight in all three countries, the same cannot be said for the trend in fiscal policy.7
Although such a policy mix may reflect the desire of central bankers in the region to
create some credibility for their institutions, it also reflects a propensity on the part of
politicians to evade difficult choices and to rely on monetary policy to make up for their
unwillingness to make difficult decisions regarding fiscal policy.
C. Exchange Rate Policy
The conduct of monetary policy has also been complicated by exchange rate
policy and by the opening up of these countries’ rather fragile financial systems to
international capital flows. High interest rates and either fixed exchange rates or pre-
announced crawling pegs have led to significant inflows of short-term capital. In order to
avoid inflationary pressures from the inflows of foreign capital, central banks have
engaged in sometimes-massive sterilization.
4 Not only has this sterilization been costly
for the central banks, but it also has not been entirely successful, so that targets for
monetary growth have often been exceeded, and interest rates have remained high in
order to prevent sudden outflows of foreign capital. Of course, such high interest rates
tend to increase costs of production, thus reducing exports and making these countries’
currencies more vulnerable to speculative attack.
In sum, the foregoing discussion suggests that monetary policy in the three
countries considered in this paper as yet rests on relatively weak financial markets and
institutions and that it operates in an environment where the agents it seeks to influence
may react to monetary policy in undesirable ways or not at all. Moreover, monetary
policy is unsupported by fiscal policy and has to promote a multitude of often-conflicting
objectives.
                                                       
4  For the Czech case, see Begg (1998), for Hungary, Szapary and Jakab (1998), and Wellisz (1997) for the
Polish case.8
III. CAUSES OF INFLATION AND POLICIES FOR DISINFLATION
A. Causes of Inflation
In order to understand the role that monetary policy can play in reducing the rate
of inflation, it is worthwhile to seek out the root causes of inflation in transition
economies. As the discussion below shows, there are some causes that are specific to the
transition economies and that do not appear to be easily combated by means of indirect
monetary tools. Most important, it does not appear that the growth of the money stock is
the main source of inflationary pressures in the short run.
1. Undervaluation of the Exchange Rate. Some observers, such as Desai (1998) and
Richards and Tersmann (1996), argue that inflation in transition economies is largely the
result of the initial over-depreciation of their currencies. This inflation is not the outcome
of the usual wage-price spiral induced by devaluation, but, rather, it is the result of the
workings of the law of one price, or commodity arbitrage, which creates domestic
inflation to as to reestablish purchasing power parity. Wellisz (1997) describes the process
in the case of the Polish crawling peg thus: “As long as the rate of slide is set so as to
result in the continuing real overvaluation (sic! – although the subsequent sentence
indicates that this should be undervaluation) of the zloty, international prices exercise an
upward pull on domestic prices” (p. 168).
2. Large Relative Price Changes. A characteristic of transition economies is that their
relative prices were badly distorted. Given the downward stickiness of prices, the bulk of
price readjustment in the course of transition thus occurs as some prices increase by large
amounts and others either remain constant or increase by relatively smaller amounts.
These large price changes, usually price increases due to the downward inflexibility of
prices, have a disproportionate effect on the price index
Pujol and Griffiths (1998) find that sectoral price changes in Poland during 1989-
1995 were, indeed, quite skewed, suggesting that, in this period, some sectors were
experiencing relatively large price changes while the price changes of other sectors were
closely bunched. Moreover, the standard deviation of sectoral price changes around the
mean was quite large, and this high standard deviation did not decline much over their
sample period. However, Coorey et al. (1998) find that the variance of relative prices does9
have a significant impact on the rate of inflation in 21 transition economies, but only when
they consider the period immediately following the initial period of price liberalization
when there was a burst of inflation and a period of large relative price changes. For the
period of late transition, neither the variance nor the skewness of sectoral price changes
had a significant impact on the rate of inflation, suggesting that perhaps it was the initial
burst of inflation and relative price realignment that drove the results obtained by Pujol
and Griffiths .
3. The Freeing of Controlled Prices. A variety of prices, mostly having to do with
government and municipal services, utilities and rents, and energy were not fully
liberalized during the initial price liberalizations. Instead, governments either froze these
prices or adopted a program of phased liberalization. In some cases, controlled prices were
to be increased in an ad hoc manner until they reached equilibrium, and then decontrolled.
In other cases, increases were based on a formula whereby prices would increase by a
factor equal to the previous years’ inflation plus some pre-specified percentage, so that
they would outpace inflation, but only by a limited amount, and thus move toward
equilibrium at a controlled pace. Often rents and municipal services were priced on a cost-
plus basis (see Czech National Bank, 1998, Table 3b).
Such a price setting pattern leads to the persistence of inflation because a part of
the consumer price index (CPI) market basket consists of goods whose prices by definition
must grow at rates that exceed the past inflation rate. Consequently, changes in the prices
of regulated goods are both inimical to reductions in the rate of inflation and exogenous as
far as monetary policy and its impact on inflation are concerned. The existence of these
goods makes it extremely difficult to reduce inflation quickly because the burden of
slowing price growth below the rates of past inflation falls on those goods in the consumer
price index whose prices are not set in this way. Moreover, as prices of controlled goods
are freed up, large one-time increases move the CPI upward in a way that disguises the
broader tendencies in prices.
4. Wage-Pull Inflation. Nominal wages in the three countries have grown more rapidly
than has the CPI, so that real wages have grown steadily since the early transition.
Productivity gains have been alleged to be lower than the gains in real wages. Some
observers (Begg, 1998; Drabek, 1999) argue that real wage growth is the result of poor10
corporate governance, which leaves managers with few incentives to resist workers’
demands for wage increases. Excessive backward-looking indexing of wages is often
institutionalized. In the Czech Republic, tripartite negotiations between the government,
labor unions and representatives have set real wage floors. In Hungary, in similar
negotiations, the unions have regularly and successfully rejected government inflation
forecasts in favor of projections based on past inflation. Moreover, in some countries, the
Czech Republic in particular, it is the government sector that has set the pace for large
wage increases.
B. What Kind of Monetary Policy for Disinflation?
Whatever institutional and environmental obstacles the monetary authorities face
in their efforts to reduce inflation to single-digit levels, they also have to decide what
kind of monetary policy to implement. In the early transition period, monetary policy was
implemented within the context of a heterodox stabilization program utilizing multiple
nominal anchors. However, the alleged use of nominal anchors, especially of the nominal
exchange rate, was discarded fairly early in Poland, later in Hungry and only on 1997 in
the Czech Republic.
5 The abandonment of the nominal exchange anchor left central
banks with the need to determine some other target for monetary policy. The money
stock was regarded as an unsatisfactory target because velocity was perceived as being
too variable. Interest rates, too, were problematic, in part because of the tenuous links
between interest rates and the behavior of economic agents and the constraints on interest
rates, both of which we have discussed above.
Consequently, an approach that was adopted explicitly by the Czech National
Bank (CNB) and sometime later by the Polish monetary authorities is inflation targeting.
The CNB’s new policy approach was announced in December 22, 1997. The concept of
net inflation, which excludes from the computation of the rate of inflation the increases in
the prices of price-regulated goods, is a key component of the new policy because all
inflation targets are set in terms of net inflation. The Bank set two targets, a “control”
                                                       
5 Although the use of the exchange rate as a nominal anchor was seen as a key element of credibility for the
transition economies’ stabilization programs, in practice the exchange rate never served that role. For the
Czech case, see Janackova (1996). Wellisz (1997) aptly sums up the Polish experience.11
target of 5.5-6.5% net inflation at the end of 1998 and a three–year target of 3.5-5.5% net
inflation by the end of 2000 (Czech National Bank, 1998) . In Poland, the Monetary
Policy Council set a target of 8-8.5% growth of the CPI in1999 and 4% for 2003. Both
central banks have stressed the advantages of inflation targeting over more traditional
approaches to monetary policy. One such advantage is the greater transparency of inflation
targeting relative to policies that target either monetary aggregates or the exchange rate. In
their adoption of inflation targeting, the CNB and the NBP are joining a number of central
banks in developed market economies such as Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany and
New Zealand all of which use inflation targeting (Mishkin and Posen, 1997).
The essence of monetary policy in countries following inflation targeting is to set
inflation targets and then to pursue them without regard to output or employment
objectives targets (McDonough, 1997). This requires that the central bank must have
considerable independence in conducting its monetary policy, including the absence of
what Masson et al. (1997) call fiscal dominance, the reliance of the state on either central
or commercial bank financing. The central bank must also forego any nominal targets
other than the price level. Moreover, the central bank must be able to calibrate the
functional relationship between its policy instruments and future inflation.
In order to evaluate the feasibility of using inflation targeting, or even of more
traditional and backward-looking approaches to monetary policy, in these transition
economies, we estimate a vector autoregressive (VAR) model of the price level for each
country. This model shows which causal factors are the most important sources of
continuing inflation these countries and thus the feasibility of reducing inflation by means
of monetary policy.
IV. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
A key issue in economic modeling is whether the time series under investigation
are nonstationary or stationary around a deterministic trend. Recent work using the VAR
specification imposes the assumption that the series under consideration are difference-
stationary (DS) (e.g., Feldstein and Stock (1994)), that is, that the original series are
nonstationary. Several studies, however, question this assumption due to the low power of12
stationarity tests (Dejong, et al. (1992), Dejong (1992), Dejong and Whiteman (1991 a, b),
and Rudebusch (1993)). These studies suggest that it is difficult to distinguish between DS
as the null and trend-stationary (TS) as the alternative hypothesis.
This distinction is important in understanding whether shocks to inflation have
permanent or transitory effects. For example, if variables are nonstationary, and
consequently best represented by the DS model, then shocks to explanatory variables
produce permanent shifts in inflation. This is because such shocks affect the stochastic
trend component of the price level and thus cause a permanent change in the inflation rate
by affecting it for all future horizons. On the other hand, if a TS model best represents the
time series, then fluctuations around a trend level of these series are stationary or mean
reverting. In such a model, shocks to explanatory variables have only a transitory impact
on inflation as the price level returns to its trend level and the long-term inflation rate
remains unchanged.
Note that under either specification there may be some persistence in the inflation
rate. For a DS model, this persistence would be permanent whereas it would be only
transitory under a TS model. Dornbusch and Fischer (1993) provide some indirect
evidence on the appropriate specification from 12 moderate-inflation countries, including
Hungary. They find that inflation persisted at moderate levels for more than a decade, thus
providing some supporting evidence for the appropriateness of a DS specification for
countries experiencing moderate inflation. Nevertheless, given the uncertainty about the
existence of a unit root in economic time series and the sensitivity of the results to the
different specifications used ( Hafer and Kutan (1997)) we model the relationship between
inflation and its potential determinants using both the TS and the DS specification. To do
so, we estimate two VAR systems. One system uses the log-levels of the variables along
with a deterministic time trend. The other uses the log-difference of the series and excludes
the trend term. The first system represents the TS specification, and the second one
represents the DS specification.13
V. DATA AND CAUSALITY TESTS RESULTS
A. Data
A data set consisting of monthly observations for M2, the broad nominal money
supply, the consumer price index (CPI), nominal average wages, and import prices is used
in the analysis. Because no monthly data are available for import prices, following
previous studies, (Laursen (1998)), this series was constructed using the exchange-rate-
adjusted foreign wholesale price index. Specifically, the German wholesale price index,
adjusted for changes in the domestic currency (forint, koruna, zloty)/DM rate, was used as
a proxy for import prices in all the estimations. The domestic currency/DM exchange rate
is obtained using the $/domestic currency and DM/domestic currency rates assuming
arbitrage. The sample period runs from 1990 to 1998 for Hungary and Poland, and 1993 to
1998 for the Czech Republic. All data are taken from the Harver data set, which is based
on OECD data, of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, except wages, which were
compiled from various issues of PlanEcon Reports. The data were seasonally adjusted
using the multiplicative (ratio-to-moving average) seasonal adjustment technique. All
estimations were carried out using the E-Views 3.1 software package.
B. Causality Test Results
 Given the ongoing methodological debate discussed in the preceding section, two
VAR systems were estimated. One system used all variables in log-levels and included a
time trend. This system represents the trend-stationary specification. Under this
specification, the dependent variable is the price level (CPI). This and other series are
assumed stationary around a trend, so the shocks to the instruments of monetary policy
have only transitory impact on the price level and thus on inflation. The other system uses
first-difference of the data but excludes the time trend. This system represents the
difference-stationary specification. Under this specification, series possess stochastic
trends in the sense that the shocks to the system are not mean reverting over time. Series
need to be first-differenced to make them stationary, so that the statistical inferences made
under OLS would be valid.  Each specification, TS or DS, includes a constant term.14
It is important to note that the standard causality tests based on the level, i.e., TS,
specification are valid only if the series are trend-stationary, or if they are difference
stationary and cointegrated. In other words, if the series are nonstationary but they are not
cointegrated, then standard F-statistics are not valid for the level specification because
they do not have the correct distribution (Sims, Stock and Watson (1990)).
Because the VAR results are sensitive to the lag length, we use the Akaike’s
information criterion to select the optimal number of lags in the estimated VARs. All
VAR specifications also include two (0,1) dummy shift variables to capture administrative
price increases for fuel and electricity as well as the introduction of, or rate changes in,
VAT and excise taxes for all three countries. In addition, a dummy variable is used to
account for the May 1997 currency crisis in the Czech Republic. Anticipating the
discussion of our results, note that all the dummy variables were significant at the 10
percent level or better. By accounting for the impact of administrative price changes at the
outset, we are more likely to capture the impact of monetary policy instruments on
inflation. In this sense, our dependent variable corresponds to the so-called “core-
inflation” used in earlier studies of inflation in transition economies (Laursen, 1998).
Tables 1 through 3 report the causality test results for the Czech Republic,
Hungary, and Poland, respectively.  Because our focus is on the relationship between the
instruments of monetary policy and inflation, the tables report only results for the inflation
rate. According to the results in Table 1, both import prices and own past lags are
significant determinants of Czech inflation at the 10 percent level or better, regardless of
the TS or DS specification employed. The outcome on the significance of money and
wages depends on the stationarity assumption used, however. Only when the difference-
stationary assumption is imposed on the data does money become a statistically significant
cause of inflation at the 5 percent level. On the other hand, wages are statistically
significant at the 10 percent level only if one assumes trend stationarity.
The causality results that are reported in Table 2 for Hungary paint somewhat a
different picture. Both import prices and own lags significantly affect inflation behavior in
Hungary at the 5 percent level of better regardless of the specification used. On the other
hand, movements in wages and in broad money do not Granger-cause price movements
for either specification.15
The test results reported in Table 3 for Poland again indicate that both import
prices and past inflation, but not wages, are significant determinants of inflation in Poland,
a finding that holds for both specifications. The significance of money is sensitive to the
stationarity assumption is used, however. Only under DS specification, money supply
movements Granger cause inflation at the 5 percent level. This means that M2 growth rate
has a permanent impact on inflation if one believes that series are best represented by the
DS model.
Overall, the causality tests results show that both import price changes and past
inflation have significantly influenced the consumer price level and inflation over time in
all these three countries. With respect to import prices, whose movements are dominated
by exchange rate changes over much of this period, the results suggest that exchange rate
policy has been a major factor on affecting inflation rate in the region. To the extent that
inflationary expectations are assumed to be adaptive, the significance of own past price
lags in our estimates implies that inflationary expectations have been very persistent,
playing an important role in inflation behavior.
Although the statistical significance of import prices and past inflation is robust
across countries and for both specifications, this is not the case for wages and the money
supply. The results indicate that wage movements have played no statistically significant
role in either Polish or Hungarian inflation, regardless of whether we use the TS or DS
model. The significance of wages in the Czech Republic is sensitive to the specification
used. Only under the TS model do wages have a statistically significant impact on
inflation at the 10 percent significance level. This finding suggests that wage changes have
only a temporary impact on inflation in the Czech Republic during our sample period.
Thus, we can conclude that changes in nominal wages did not have a significant
permanent impact on inflation in any of the countries in our sample.
Changes in broad money supply, M2, are significant for both the Czech Republic
and Poland but only using the DS model. This is consistent with the expectation that, in
the long run, inflation is, indeed, a monetary phenomenon. Assuming that the DS model
better captures the true underlying data generating process for inflation and the other
variables in our system, we find that the M2 growth rate had a permanent effect on
inflation in both countries during the 1990-98 period.16
VI. VARIANCE DECOMPOSITIONS
The foregoing tests determined the extent to which import prices, wages, broad
money (M2), and past inflation are statistically significant in explaining the behavior of
current level of inflation. A natural question to ask is whether a change in these variables
is economically significant in affecting inflation, that is, does a shock to the money stock
or to import prices generate a relatively large change in inflation. To address this
question, variance decompositions from the different VAR models are calculated, using
the Cholesky decomposition procedure. Two orderings are used. One ordering is prices
(CPI), wages, import prices and money (M2). As a check on the results, an alternative
ordering of money, import prices, wages and prices also is used. Again, Akaike’s
criterion is used to select the number of optimal lags in the estimated VARs.
Tables 3 through 6 report the variance decompositions, using up to twelve-month
horizon. Results are reported for up to four horizons, for each of the two possible
orderings, and for the TS and DS specifications. Looking first at the results for the Czech
Republic in Table 4, the variance decompositions generated by the first ordering, CPI,
wages, import prices, M2, in the upper part of the table in panel A, indicate that shocks to
M2 account for about 10.7 and 7.7 percent of the variation in inflation over a 12-month
horizon under the DS and TS assumptions, respectively. The wage shocks play a larger
role in inflation variation under the TS specification, 14.8 percent versus 7.8 percent,
which is consistent with the evidence from the causality test results in Table 1. The limited
impact of money stock and wage shocks on the rate of inflation in Table 3 stand in stark
contrast to the strong impact from shocks to the import prices. Over a time horizon of one
year, this variable accounts for 29.9 and 23.3 percent of the variation in inflation under the
DS and TS models, respectively. Finally, the own past shocks, representing persistence in
inflation over time, account for 51.6 and 54.2 percent of variation in inflation at the end of
12-month horizon under the DS and TS models, respectively. Changing the ordering of the
variables, as shown in the lower part of Table 4 in panel B, does not materially change the
results.
Comparing our decomposition results with those of the causality test results, we
conclude that nominal wage and money supply changes have not had a significant role in
explaining the behavior of inflation in the Czech Republic. At best, changes in wages and17
M2 can explain 18.0 (under the TS model) and 10.7 percent (under the DS model) of the
total variation in inflation rate during the entire sample period. On the other hand, past
inflation, which serves as a proxy for the persistence of inflationary expectations, and
growth of import prices have been the main causes of inflation in the Czech Republic,
jointly explaining about 75 percent of inflation variation during the 1993-98 period.
The decomposition results for Hungary are reported in Table 5. When the panel A
ordering is used, M2 shocks account for 5.6 and 4.3 percent of the variation in inflation
over the 12-month horizon, depending on whether the difference-stationary or trend-
stationary assumption is used. The effect of wages is relatively weak, accounting for 9.4
and 18.5 of the variation in inflation under the DS and TS models, respectively. Over the
12-month horizon, the import price shocks account 7.4 and 51.6 percent of inflation
variation depending upon the DS and TS assumption is used, while own past innovations
account 77.6 and 25.6 percent variation in inflation under the DS and TS specifications,
respectively. The results are robust to re-ordering. Switching to the alternative ordering in
panel B does not qualitatively change the results.
Note that the effects of changing the stationarity assumption are more marked for
Hungary than for the Czech Republic. If one assumes trend-stationarity, shocks to import
prices have a very small impact on inflation in panel A, about 7 percent. When one
imposes difference stationarity on the data, however, the impact of shocks to import prices
is increased to about 57 percent. These results are again robust to the re-ordering in panel
B. This finding suggests that the impact of import price shocks on inflation can be best
described as transitory. Similar results hold for past innovations in the rate of inflation.
Under the TS specification, the past own shocks account for about 25 percent of total
variation in inflation; but this effect jumps up to about 77 percent under the DS
specification, suggesting that the impact of past inflation shocks on current inflation are
permanent and much larger under the DS model than for the TS model.
Finally, Table 6 presents the variance decompositions for Poland. Using the panel
A ordering, the effect of an M2 shock on inflation is about 11 and 2 percent under the DS
and TS assumptions, respectively. Wage shocks have a very limited role in explaining
inflation variation regardless of the specification used. Again, import prices and own price
shocks have the strongest impact on inflation variation in Poland. The results for the18
import price shocks are also sensitive to the stationarity assumption employed, however.
The effect of an import price shock falls from 35.0 percent to 22.6 percent when we
impose the difference-stationary assumption. Using the alternative ordering produces
similar results.
Overall, the variance decomposition results indicate that import price shocks and
own past innovations, meaning the persistence of expectations regarding the rate of
inflation, have played the most important role in explaining the dynamics of inflation in all
the countries in our sample. The relative effects of the explanatory variables on inflation
also are affected significantly by the stationarity assumption employed, while re-ordering
of the variables in the estimated VAR systems did not change the results qualitatively. For
example, if one assumes trend-stationary, shocks to import prices have a much larger
impact on inflation than do shocks under difference-stationarity, and this result is quite
robust with respect to the ordering of the variables. Again, the result that import prices
have a larger role under the TS specification in explaining inflation variation, in particular
for Poland and Hungary, suggests that the import price changes have a significant but
transitory impact on inflation. 
VII. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In the three countries we examine, nominal wage growth and the money supply are
quantitatively unimportant contributors to the inflationary process in the short run.
Because these two factors, which are relatively easy for monetary authorities to influence,
have so little short-term impact on inflation, monetary policy may be quite impotent in
combating moderate inflation.
In the TS specification, the dominance of import prices suggests that changes in
import prices brought about by changes in the nominal exchange rate may be the principal
source of transitory shocks to inflation. This may explain why the Czech Republic, which
maintained a nominal peg the longest and which, by virtue of the peg’s design, actually19
experienced significant periods of appreciation versus the DM, had the lowest inflation
rate of the three countries.
6
Our findings regarding the role of foreign prices in determining inflation also
explain the sharp decline in inflation in the three countries at the end of 1998. Import
prices measured on a month-on-month basis fell by as much as 10 percent by year end
1998. Tradables account for about 70 percent of the CPI in these three countries. Thus the
importance of foreign prices in propagating or, in this case, ameliorating inflation implied
by our econometric results well explains the precipitous decline in the rate of inflation in
these countries.
At the same time, the important role of the exchange rate in influencing inflation in
this specification might suggest that nominal appreciation or at least a fixing of the
nominal exchange rate is the appropriate policy. There are two problems with this. First,
such a policy stance would hardly differentiate a forward-looking inflation targeting
policy form the old one of a nominal exchange rate anchor. Second, it implies a real
appreciation of the transition economies’ currencies, an appreciation that seems
incompatible with current account equilibrium, with promoting export-led growth and
with preventing massive capital flows.
The longer-term implications seem to be equally disappointing for monetary policy
advocates. The other main source of current inflation is its past path, which can be
interpreted to represent the inflationary expectations of the population. Masson et al.
(1997) offer some insights on why inflationary expectations may persist. Among the
causes of the persistence of inflationary expectations they cite are:
-symptoms of fiscal dominance, meaning the government’s use of the central bank
or of commercial banks to finance its deficit (p.8);
-poor starting conditions, especially levels of inflation in excess of 10% (p. 20);
-a failure to eradicate the fiscal roots of inflation (p.22).
These factors can be found to a greater or lesser extent in each of the three
countries we have examined. Moreover, the monetary authorities can resolve none of
them. Indeed, with the exception of the second factor, the responsibility for creating the
                                                       
6 The Czech koruna was pegged to a basket made up of the US$ and the DM. Given fluctuations in the
$/DM rate, the koruna’s value versus the DM actually fluctuated significantly during the period when it
was pegged.20
appropriate conditions rests squarely with the governments of these countries. Given the
importance of foreign prices and their current decline, a window of opportunity exists to
seize this opportunity to lower current inflation and inflationary expectations. Such a
lowering of expectations could set of a virtuous cycle of falling inflation due to the
importance of the persistence of inflation for its future course. The opportunity to seize
this opportunity is seemingly more in the hands of the governments rather than in the
hands of the central banks of these countries.
Our results suggest that the decline in inflation experienced by the three countries
at the end of 1998 (Figure 1) is the result of external deflation that stems from exogenous
declines in global commodity and energy prices and from a general global deflation. In
1998, this trend of global deflation was augmented by relatively favorable exchange rates
between these three countries’ currencies and those of their major trading partners. Thus,
the sharp decline in inflation observed at the end of the 1998 in the three countries should
be seen as an exogenously caused event rather than the outcome of monetary policy.
7
These exogenous factors could well reverse themselves relatively quickly, as energy
prices are already beginning to do. Even so, to the extent that the current fall in inflation
translates itself into a permanent change in inflationary expectations, inflation may indeed
remain low in the transition economies.
                                                       
7 There is, of course, nothing wrong with taking advantage of such fortuitous exogenous shocks. As Burton
and Fischer (1998) note in their survey of countries that have successfully ended moderate inflation, “… it
is important to capitalize on favorable exogenous shocks….” (p. 34).21
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APPENDIX: TABLES
Table 1: Causality Test Results: F-Statistics – The Czech Republic




























1. DS represents difference-stationary while TS indicates trend-stationary. The optimal lag length in
estimated VARs is chosen based on the minimizing the Akaike’s information criterion and it is 3
and 4 for the TS and DS specifications, respectively.
2. All VAR estimations included three (0,1) dummy shift variables to capture the May 1997 currency
crisis, the administrative price hikes for fuel and electricity, and VAT and excise taxes. The results
(not reported) showed that all the dummy variables were significant at the 10 percent significance
level or better.
3. Since there is no quarterly data available for import prices, following previous studies (e.g.,
Laursen, 1998) this series was constructed using the exchange rate adjusted foreign wholesale
price index. Specifically, German wholesale price index adjusted for changes in the koruna/DM
rate was used as a proxy for import prices in all the estimations here and that follow. The
koruna/DM exchange rate is obtained using the $/koruna and DM/koruna rates assuming arbitrage.
4. The values in parentheses are the p-values for the statistical significance of the variables.26
Table 2: Causality Test Results: F-Statistics – Hungary





























2. Lag length for both specifications was six based on the Akaike’s criterion.
Sample period for Hungary starts in December 1990 because there was no monthly published data available
prior to this date. The National Bank of Hungary has also stopped publishing figures for M2 in the end of
1997. The figures for 1998 were compiled using the individual components of M2 published by the Bank.
Table 3: Causality Test Results: F-Statistics – Poland





























2. Lag length for both specifications was six using the Akaike’s criterion.27
Table 4:  Variance Decompositions for Inflation: The Czech Republic
Panel A: Ordering- CPI, Wage, Import Price, Money
% of inflation explained by innovations in:
Horizon Money Wages Import Prices CPI
DS TS DS TS DS TS DS TS
3 11.8 1.7  0.8  3.7 18.9  9.6 68.3 85.0
6 11.5 3.6  7.4  8.7 26.3 24.2 54.7 63.4
9 10.9 6.7  7.3 13.3 29.7 23.3 52.1 56.7
12 10.7 7.7  7.8 14.8 29.9 23.3 51.6 54.2
Panel B: Ordering – Money, Import Price, Wages, CPI
% of inflation explained by innovations in:
Horizon Money Wages Import Prices CPI
DS TS DS TS DS TS DS TS
3  10.3  2.1  0.7 15.8 22.8 10.8 66.2 66.2
6  10.7  4.0  4.5 20.8 30.2 21.3 54.5 54.5
9  10.0  7.0  4.9 18.2 32.3 28.9 52.6 52.6
12   9.9  6.9  5.2 18.0 32.7 31.8 52.1 52.128
Table 5:  Variance Decompositions for Inflation: Hungary
Panel A: Ordering- CPI, Wage, Import Price, Money
% of inflation explained by innovations in:
Horizon Money Wages Import Prices CPI
DS TS DS TS DS TS DS TS
3  2.3  0.3  6.2  1.4 1.7  1.4 89.8 96.9
6  3.3 10.2  8.6  5.9 4.4 19.5 83.6 64.3
9  4.6  6.1  9.0 16.3 6.5 43.2 79.8 34.4
12  5.6  4.3  9.4 18.5 7.4 51.6 77.6 25.6
Panel B: Ordering – Money, Import Price, Wages, CPI
% of inflation explained by innovations in:
Horizon Money Wages Import Prices CPI
DS TS DS TS DS TS DS TS
3  6.4  7.8  7.8  1.3  3.6  8.8 82.1  82.1
6  7.4 10.6  9.4  6.3  5.2 30.8 78.0  52.2
9  7.7  6.9  9.6 18.8  7.3 41.2 75.3  33.1
12  9.1  6.6  10.0 21.6  7.7 45.2 73.1  26.529
Table 6:  Variance Decompositions for Inflation: Poland
Panel A: Ordering- CPI, Wage, Import Price, Money
% of inflation explained by innovations in:
Horizon Money Wages Import Prices CPI
DS TS DS TS DS TS DS TS
3  11.5  3.2  0.3  1.0 14.6  14.7 73.7 81.0
6  11.3  2.2  2.9  0.8 20.9  27.2 64.8 69.0
9  11.3  2.2  4.3  1.0 21.7  33.7 62.7 63.1
12  11.1  1.9  5.5  1.7 22.6  35.0 60.7 61.5
Panel B: Ordering – Money, Import Price, Wages, CPI
% of inflation explained by innovations in:
Horizon Money Wages Import Prices CPI
DS TS DS TS DS TS DS TS
3  16.4  3.0  0.5   0.5  13.0  13.1 70.0  83.5
6  16.5  2.5  3.2   0.4  18.5  25.0 61.7  72.1
9  17.4  2.4  4.3   0.6  19.3  31.5 59.1  65.5
12  17.5  2.5  5.3   1.4  20.0  32.7 57.2  63.32008
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